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Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
RE: Gaw v. Linqle - Case No. 890139-CA 
As permitted by Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, appellant replies briefly to Respondent's 
Memorandum of Newly Uncovered Authority (June 11, 1990). 
Respondent argues that three other experts on accident 
reconstruction testified at the trial, and thus, there was no 
prejudice in striking a fourth expert. 
It is true that three accident reconstruction experts 
did testify (Probert, Smith and Beaufort). However, the excluded 
witness was not an accident reconstruction expert at all. 
Rather, he was a human factors research scientist. (See Brief of 
Appellant at Point I.) 
The testimony of the human factor's research scientist 
was completely different from the traffic accident reconstruction 
experts. (See Brief of Appellant at Point 1(A).) 
An analogy might be an airplane accident. Suppose that 
pilots have given expert testimony. Certainly that doesn't mean 
that mechanics are then excluded from giving expert testimony. 
In this case, appellant sought to prove her case by 
putting on evidence from traffic accident reconstruction experts, 
as well as somewhat different evidence from a human factor's 
scientist. The ruling of the trial court excluded half of 
appellant's case. 
Sincerely, 
RJD\jn 
cc: Counsel of Record 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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Case N o . : 890139-CA 
Dear Ms, Noonan: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I 
advise of the case of Onyeabor v. Pro-Roofing, Inc., 128 Utah 
Adv. Rpt. 23 (CA 1990). Point II of that case at page 25, the 
last full paragraph pertains to Point I of Respondent's brief, in 
view of the fact that the expert mentioned in that point was one 
of four experts testifying on accident reconstruction and 
liability. The other experts were witnesses Probert, Smith, and 
Beaufort. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Yours truly, 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Robert R. Wallace 
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Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Gaw v. Lingle 
Case No. 890139-CA 
Dear Clerk: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) the respondents call to the Court's 
attention the case of Ostler v. Albina Transfer Company, 117 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 14 (September 8, 1989), a decision of this Court, which 
relates to the admission or exclusion of expert testimony, and to 
the review of issues relating to jury instructions. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Yours truly, 
HANSONS-EPPERSON & SMITH 
Robert R. Wallace 
RRW/llh 
cc. Robert J. DeBry 
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4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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JURISDICTION' .AND MATURE OP PROCEEDINGS 
This court has jurisdiction pursuan t: to U tali Code Ann. %\ 8-
2-2(3) (j). 
Th I s :ii s i n e q l i g e n c e iii„ 1: i o n i in « nth in h found t h e 
p l a i n t i f f 75% n e g l i g e n t for t h e a c c i d e n t in q u t b i i ^ J ^ .pptsal 
i s from th< = judgment , no c a u s e of a c t i o n . A r e l a t e d a p p e a l 
*-s t h e g i:,"a n t o t" sunuiia i • y | udqiuun L I. o IL ho de f e n d a n t St ai 1' *~ o f 
U t a h , 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Fay f.^ j* *hiie turning . etr from a side street onto 
. . ** : I • . :)f a tr uck :I ri \ ei I 
t>y d e f e n d a n t Jimmy Wxay L i n g . e ano *• * y i e f e n d a n t Roadrunner 
T r u c k i n g , 
a 1 I eqed t h a t d<->] endrint l.« i ng I <•» m.Hj I. i qenl I yr 
o p e r a t e d h i s t r u c k , a l t h o u g h he had t h e r i g h t of way on a major 
t h o r o u g h f a r e , P 1 a i n t i f f ' s p l e a d i n g s a J so a 1 l e g e d t ha I s I ie was 
confused b e c a u s e t he S t a t e had negl igenl 1 y d e s i g n e d eonsl fuelled 
and mam La i ned t h e i uad , 
The t r i a l court , g r a n t e d summary judgment in favor of t h e 
S t a t e of III ih Iiiiiii In was fo l lowed by jn :iry t r i a l in which 
Hjijgiuoiit viiia y id i i tud in iai . 1 the r e m a i n i n g de fendan t s . 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On April 16, 1984, the plaintiff, Fay Gaw, pulled out 
from a stop sign on a side street directly into the path of a 
semi-tractor trailer travelling southbound on the main highway, 
State Road 6, near Helper, Carbon County, Utah, Plaintiff's age 
was not given, but she was elderly: she had eight children and 
26 grandchildren. Tr. at 548 and 550. She was familiar with the 
intersection and had travelled that same route on many occasions. 
See quotations from the transcript under Point II, below, 
concerning her familiarity with the intersection. 
2. The intersection provided a lane for traffic travelling 
the path which Gaw intended to travel, that is, for traffic 
leaving Helper and turning left onto Highway 6. See Trial 
Exhibits, diagrams of highway. The lane did not even merge into 
southbound traffic on Highway 6, but went south eventually 
becoming a lane of its own (hereafter referred to as the "safety 
lane"). Id. Southbound traffic through the intersection was 
restricted to one lane. Id. The safety lane eventually joined 
that single lane of southbound traffic, forming two lanes of 
southbound traffic and elimination the need for any merging. 
Id. The safety lane was clearly marked with painted lines. Id. 
and Tr. at 575 through 576. 
2 
3 . The d a y was c l e a r and ill „ hi it 5 54 and 566 A f t e r 
havi i i i j H 1 o | (pen J ill Mil1 h luj i .HIJII wes l ix HIHIII I, i i iw | IMH i ji jilhd 111111I11 I I in 
i n t e r s e c t i o n I>n11 d i d n o t t u r n i n t o t h e s a f e t y l a n e , Tr at. b55 
t h r o u g h ii'ih In | in »« «i >ill I lie s a f e t y I inn iind a p p e a r e d , t o 
s o u t h b o u n d I r a t i n , In In1 a nit inn I inj .n i n s s I In lni |hwii r In I In 
s t r e e t s I I he we-)! T r , a t 6 5 9 , I n s t e a d nf w a i t i n g a t I he 
b r o a d m e d i a n b e t w e e n n o r t h and s o u t h b o u n d t r a f f i c , he IIHIJCIJI t o 
t tu in I 11 I In1 bi nit In i ml 11 I lit1 sotit hbound I line 1111 I r a l I i i i HI III i t\\\wr\y 
6* . r . cr >»56. Trie d r i v e r of t h e t r u c k , Jimmy Wray L i n g l e 
' h e r e a f t e i L . n q J e ^ , 3 - ,>-; v e h i c L e p u l l n u t from t h e s t o p 
- - i in | */» I K i i IHS f he h i ijhu \\ in nut 
w o u l d s t o j . •: : : *- i - d i e i y i n e u ^ n and a l l o w him t o p a s s , li a t 
656 t h r o u g h 6 5 7 , ft5^ When lie saw t h a t s h e was no t s t o p p i n g and 
Wii at I eiapt i ny I nl i m III i I nn 11 I I i avi I , In I i in 11 I 11 i. i i < i * 
and a p p l i e d h i s b r a k e s , Tr ill li 'i1 MM He was u n a b l e t o d v u i d 
t h e a c c i d e n t T r . a t 6 6 0 . 
4 . There was ri ::: • evnh-Mirn 1 hall plriiril iff was I ucii w i I IIi in/ 
emergency or o the r j u s t i f i c a t i o n or excuse ;«:, . f a i l i n g zo 
t u rn l e f t i i • I :) the sa fe ty lane or j u s t i f y i n g her t r a v e l l i n g 
across the pa il nted med :i an 3 iiii nes :i  n t D I sfendanl IJ I. IU;I 1 e " i. I HMI vf 
t r ave l , o i, he i t ;urn I ny in to the* southbound I ane o f t r a f f I c when 
I t was unsafe to do so, 
3 
5. The jury found the defendants, Lingle and Roadrunner 
Trucking, 25% negligent, and the plaintiff 75% negligent. R. at 
1671; Tr. 881. The jury left the damage line on the verdict form 
blank, indicating their knowledge of the effect of their verdict. 
R. at 1671; Tr. at 881. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The judgment rendered in the trial court in favor of 
defendants Jimmy Wray Lingle and Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 
should be affirmed because no reversible error was committed by 
the trial court. Alternatively, if it be determined that error 
was committed, such error was harmless to plaintiff. 
2. Plaintiff Gaw's expert on human factors was allowed to 
testify on the ultimate issues in the case for which he believed 
he was qualified, and presented substantial testimony on the 
reasonableness of conduct of the parties at the intersection 
where the accident occurred. Plaintiff's expert testified that 
he was unqualified to render an opinion on whether the conduct of 
the parties conformed to the "reasonably prudent person" 
negligence standard. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in preventing plaintiff's expert from testifyingf in an 
area where he was without qualification. Utah Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 702 (1989). 
4 
3. The trial court's negli gence i nstruetions d i d not 
const itu te reversible error. I t I 3 i »" = 1 ] esta bJ i shed that 
violation of a statue or ordinance is negl igence per se, subject 
on Iy to just ification or excuse. Jo rqensen v. Issa# 739 P.2d 80, 
82 ( Utah App 198 7); Hornsbv v. Corp., of the Presiding Bishop, 
758 P. 2d 929, 934 (Utah App, ] 988) Plaintiff presented no 
evidence establish I r .g a justi fication or excuse for hen: failure 
to conform to law. P] aintif f testi fi ed tha t: she ha I safely 
negotio' nlersection on several occasj.i- -r ' ^ 
confu-* ' - + -;r?ert:on. 
4. jride . court . i. • . _ . 
and, > r.*< ipp, . if K system comparative fault, tte dry 
was :4* --- * «• ' '*rrc~- -. v' ' "*i + • * . •** 
the ^i.ic, ,..«I:UL;^. . ., . examp.e ] 
presented .*• j , s : that allocated 25% ot the 
negligence I : * * * * • *3r : • - - *- )bi to defendants. 
a :rebu. ,i. * _,.,.. _^ > recover dama 
if such had been proven. 
5 The lory instructions taken as a kfhole and not singling 
I l l i J l l l l ' i . 1 U l I I l U l l r i p p l O p K 1 i l l I t ; 1 J y i-1 l l Il ; i Il II III III || II I II ', Il II 111 II , I W 
b. 'Lven if the instructions are somehow determined to be 
error, such error was harmless where the jury was at all times 
5 
free to proportion the fault and award plaintiff damages, but 
felt plaintiff was not entitled to damages. 
7. In instruction no. 13, the trial court instructed the 
jury that it was the duty of both drivers involved in the 
accident to use reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid 
danger, keep a proper lookout, keep control of their vehicles, 
and drive at a safe speed. The trial court clearly instructed 
the jury that defendant Lingle was to be held to a duty to 
exercise due care. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT ON 
HUMAN FACTORS WAS ALLOWED TO TESTIFY 
REGARDING THE ULTIMATE ISSUES FOR WHICH HE 
WAS QUALIFIED AND ON THE REASONABLENESS OF 
ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES. 
Plaintiff Gaw seeks reversal by arguing that her expert was 
not allowed to testify on what constitutes reasonable, prudent 
conduct under the legal term. Plaintiff is correct that the 
trial court requested that her expert on human factors not 
testify concerning what reasonable, prudent conduct is under the 
legal term. Tr. at 268. Nevertheless, the trial court's ruling 
was not error for two reasons: (1) plaintiff's expert, Mr. Slade 
6 
Hulbert, testified that he is not trained ;-i * re Law and is 
unable to testily roc(di;diii(„| LJie i edfeiunnlj I y . .-
(2) Mr Hulbert did testify as to the reasonable . UI,A.-*\ . r users 
of the highway at the intersection in question, deluding -he 
par ties hereto. 
Rule 702 of Hur Utah Rule?* - r Evidence provides the 
following: 
i t s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n i c a 1 , o r o t h e r 
s p e c i a l i z e d knowledge w i l l a s s i s t t h e t r i e r 
of f a c t t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e e v i d e n c e o r t o 
d e t e r m i n e a f a c t i n i s s u e , a w i t n e s s 
q u a l i f i e d as au exper t by knowledge, s k i l l , 
e x p e r i e n c e , t r a i n i n g e d u c a t i o n , may 
t e s t i f y t h c ^ e r ^ - .r^ — .. ~ r 
o t h e r w i s e • 
- , ' I I I I I I H 1 I I H i 
suitability * expert testimony ana ^m-* qudi i r icdtions of the 
proposed exper+ *;'pe5s State v . 2: ctyton. *;46 (> ":JC! 723, 726 
S s
* ^ f - I - ' » f • -"1; I) If 
n- r j s s a r y f a c t s . g j * - r^exus 
* ^ o i n m n ano t t « , - i - ^
 i r ^ t-^*ralr> • i s h e d , ";he 
1 ^ 3 - * s ~ ?
 t M a r t i n 
dickgrounc of 
3 
fan I l i a i i" v 
be tween 
expeir 1 '" 
Edwards 
v . Mott 
the 
v. . 
# 
A . t.-, 
f?X } ' * - ! ' 
* t ' *-•* * 
. * 
7 
testify regarding the actions of a prudent person under the legal 
definition. 
Plaintiff complains that the trial court did not allow 
plaintiff's expert to testify as to the reasonably prudent 
conduct of plaintiff. Brief of App. at 7. The trial court 
precluded Mr. Hulbert from testifying about reasonably prudent 
conduct under the legal term, because Mr. Hulbert clearly 
indicated during his proffer of proof that he was not qualified 
so to testify: 
Q (by Mr. DeBry): What does the word 
reasonable conduct mean to a human factors 
scientist? 
A: Well, I can really only speak for myself; 
but generally I think that there's a common-
fa irly common understanding and that is 
definitely not the legal reasonable man 
concept. Because we're not trained in the 
law. Well, some human factors people are, 
but I am not. It refers and describes 
behavior that most likely would occur for the 
persons whose behavior we're analyzing under 
the circumstances that that behavior 
occurred. And that behavior may or may not 
be legal behavior and still would be 
reasonable, or might well be reasonable even 
though it might not be necessarily lawful 
behavior under the law as it would exist at 
any particular time, because the laws change, 
and human behavior doesn't. 
8 
Tr a t 23811 9 th rough 239:6 (emphas i s added) The e x p e r t s t a t e d 
he c o u l d determi ne some r easonab le conduct , I il in HI i edsoiidili 1 y 
" p r u d e n t " c o n d u c t : 
Q: You stated that you cannot - wi th respect 
to Mrs. Gaw, that you do not determ ine what a 
reasonably prudent person does, but what Mrs. 
Gaw. Now does that apply also to Mr, Lingle, 
that you could analyze his personal actions 
but not the actions of a reasonably prudent 
person under the circumstances? Is that -
MR. DEBRY: I object to that question, your 
Honor. The objection - its asking the 
witness to comment -;qa 1 standard. 
And he's not a lawyer, he ; ng hirr *-> 
interpret the legal -
THE COURT: well, objec . > 
see if he can answer. 
THE WITNESS: Well, I avoid using the term 
prudent and negligent in regard to behavior 
because those are legal terms of art as I 
understand it but the answer to your 
question, if I may - if I can edit out the 
word prudent, yes* 
Tr. 256:2 through ] 6 (emj'/ ^ :~i~- :/v ~ : .- lission, 
pi a in t: iff • s expex t: „ « a s . . • - , ties ti fy 
regarding reasona.b.1 y prudent behavii. * - ruling the 
tri al court si mpl y a 1 1 owed only the test I mony for wh i ch the 
from, being mis led The coin: t did not prevent Mr. Hulbert from 
testifying on any issue for which he was qualified, but only from 
9 
testifying to a legal term which he admitted he did not 
understand. 
The court did allow the expert to testify as to the general 
reasonableness of plaintiff's actions as he understood the term 
reasonable. Beginning at page 286 of the trial transcript, Mr. 
Hulbert considers the reasonableness of plaintiff's actions and 
of other drivers using the highway at the intersection in 
question. In answer to questions of plaintiff's counsel, Mr. 
Hulbert testified: 
A: . . . so initially attention of any such 
motorist, including Mrs. Gaw, would be 
directed typically to the left . . . then 
Mrs. Gaw, . . . and many motorists would do 
the same at this location, would proceed into 
the intersection, at which time the next task 
for such a motorist is to determine there is 
no threatening traffic coming from the right 
. And because of the configuration of 
this particular roadway intersection, there's 
a very high task load on such a driver, 
Tr. at 287:2 to 12 (emphasis added). He further testified: 
A: . . . The result of that is that until a 
motorist is out in this area, (indicating) 
where Mrs. Gaw must have been at one point in 
time before the crash, as any other motorist 
using the intersection would be out in this 
area . . . it's not possible to see where the 
wheels of that vehicle approaching are 
contacting the road surface. 
Tr. at 288:1 to 8 (emphasis added). Mr. Hulbert continued: 
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A: so these *•>. .
 t^:s ot the original 
- scene contributed to an unusually high task 
• load for any user of this intersection, 
including Mrs• Gaw. 
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A: . . . so the best I can understand is it's 
very, very likely - of course, I can only 
deal in likelihoods. I can't tell you what 
happened in Mrs. Gaw's mind. Nobody can. 
But in a great high percentage, much greater 
than fifty-fifty, based upon her behavior as 
an interpretive guide in reconstruction 
theory, Mrs. Gaw was not aware that she had 
this safe movement available to her 
(indicating). 
] ] 
Tr. at 291:13-20. See Point II, below for page citations to 
plaintiff's own testimony that she was familiar with the safety 
lane. The questioning continued: 
Q: Could she have been misled or confused 
about the speed or distance of the oncoming 
truck? 
A: Oh yes, I went into that earlier. 
Tr. at 292:18 through 20. 
Plaintiff also complains that Mr. Hulbert was not allowed to 
testify regarding the actions of defendant Lingle. However, at 
no time did the trial court restrict Mr. Hulbert's ability to 
give testimony with respect to defendant Lingle. 
The trial court did not misunderstand the law. The only 
testimony it prevented plaintiff's expert from giving was 
testimony regarding the actions of a prudent person, testimony 
which the expert himself admitted he was unqualified to give. 
Tr. at 238:19 through 239:6. The discretion placed in the trial 
court clearly was not abused and should not be overturned. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT BECAUSE 1) THE TRIAL COURT'S 
NEGLIGENCE PER SE INSTRUCTIONS WERE 
APPROPRIATE AS A MATTER OF LAW AND THE JURY 
WAS AT ALL TIMES FREE TO ASSIGN UP TO 100 
PERCENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE TO DEFENDANTS, 2) 
NO EVIDENCE EXISTED JUSTIFYING OR EXCUSING 
THE FAILURE OF PLAINTIFF TO COMPLY WITH THE 
LAW, AND 3) THE PLAINTIFF SOUGHT NO 
INSTRUCTION ON JUSTIFICATION OR EXCUSE. 
Plaintiff Gaw characterizes three of the negligence 
instructions given by the trial court to the jury as per se 
negligence instructions and argues that the failure of the trial 
court to instruct on prima facie negligence was prejudicial 
error. Plaintiff is mistaken. The three negligence instructions 
to the jury were clearly appropriate under present Utah law. 
In Joraensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987), this 
Court reviewed a jury verdict which found plaintiff and defendant 
each 50% negligent in a traffic accident, which denied recovery 
to plaintiff under Utah's comparative negligence system, Utah 
Code Ann. §78-27-38 et seq. (1987). Plaintiff appealed, claiming 
the trial court erred by refusing to allow a jury instruction on 
justification or excuse after the court agreed to allow a 
negligent per se instruction. Joraensen, supra. The trial court 
instructed the jury on the duty of a driver to use reasonable 
care to keep a proper lookout, keep his vehicle under control, 
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and drive at a safe speed. Jorqensen, 739 P.2d at 81 n.l. The 
trial court concluded that instruction as follows: 
Failure to operate his vehicle in accordance 
with the foregoing requirements of the law 
would constitute negligence on his part. 
Jorqensen, supra. The trial court refused to give the following 
instruction on justification or excuse: 
A violation of such a statute or duty by a 
driver may be subject to justification or 
excuse if the driver's conduct can 
nevertheless be reasonably said to fall 
within the standard of reasonable care under 
the circumstances. The following facts may 
be considered in determining whether a driver 
is excused or justified in violating a 
statute or duty: 
A. The driver is unable after reasonable 
diligence or care to comply with the statute 
or duty; or 
B. He is confronted by an emergency which 
was not caused by his own misconduct; or 
C. Compliance would involve a greater risk 
of harm to the driver or to others. 
Jorqensen, 739 P.2d at 82. 
On the question of whether the trial court erred in failing 
to submit the above instruction to the jury, this Court 
specifically held that negligence per se instructions are 
appropriate: 
[I]t is well established that violation of a 
statute or ordinance is negligence per se 
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which may be excused if the negligent actor 
is confronted with an emergency not his own 
fault. Hall v, Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 851 
(Utah 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§288A (1965). 
Jorgensen, supra. Explaining that in order for a justification 
or excuse theory to apply, a statute or ordinance must have been 
violated, this Court observed that the jury had not been 
instructed on violation of a statute, and the facts did not 
indicate that plaintiff had violated a statute or ordinance. 
Jorgensen, supra. This Court held that the instructions given on 
the reasonable person standard referred to above, presented the 
jury with the appropriate standards for determining whether or 
not plaintiff was negligent. Jorgensen, supra. The trial court 
had instructed the jury that the failure by defendant to comply 
with the "requirements of the law would constitute negligence on 
his part." Jorgensen, 739 P.2d at 81 n.l (emphasis added). This 
Court explained that the finding of negligence took into account 
all circumstances of the case, including the fact that plaintiff 
was suddenly confronted with defendant's vehicle straddling the 
center line just prior to the accident, and affirmed the jury 
verdict denying recovery. Jorgensen, 739 P.2d at 82. The 
negligence per se instructions were proper. 
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In Hornsby v. Corp, of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 
934 (Utah App. 1988), this Court held that plaintiff was not 
entitled to an instruction on negligence per se but only because 
it was clear no violation had occurred. This Court did not rule 
that a negligence per se instruction was inappropriate; on the 
contrary, this Court articulated exactly the opposite view, 
citing to its holding in Jorgensen: "Violation of a statute or 
ordinance is negligence per se." Hornsby, supra. As in 
Jorgensen, where the facts failed to reveal a violation of 
statute by plaintiff and made his requested instruction 
unnecessary, this Court in Hornsby refused plaintiff's requested 
instruction for the same reason. Hornsby, supra. It is clear 
that this Court will not upset the discretion of a trial court 
which gives a jury instruction justified by the facts and 
accurately reflecting the law. 
Plaintiff's characterization of the three jury instructions 
in question as negligence per se instructions is completely 
unavailing. Violation of a statute or ordinance in Utah is 
negligence per se. Jorgensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah App. 
1987); Homsbv v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 
934 (Utah App. 1988). Plaintiff's claim that Utah has never 
adopted the per se rule is clearly incorrect. In support of her 
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claim, plaintiff cites to several cases which were decided prior 
to the tort reform which occurred in Utah in April, 1986, 
codified at Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 to -43 (1987). Prior to 
such tort reform, an instruction that an act of one of the 
parties constituted negligence would have been, in most cases, 
dispositive with respect to that party. Under the present Utah 
comparative negligence system, regardless of whether such an 
instruction is given, the jury in rendering its verdict is always 
free to ascribe whatever percentage of fault it deems 
appropriate to each party. 
Plaintiff cites to Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 395 P.2d 62, 
63-64 (Utah 1964), to support its position that negligence per se 
instructions are inappropriate. The trial court had ruled that 
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and 
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Thompson, 395 
P.2d at 63. In 1964, however, when the Supreme Court of Utah 
addressed that appeal, a finding of contributory negligence on 
the part of plaintiff would entirely prohibit recovery. The 
Court reversed the summary judgment and, because negligence was 
an all-or-nothing proposition in Utah at the time, held that 
violation of a statute was to be regarded as prima facie evidence 
of negligence, subject to justification or excuse "if the 
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evidence is such that it reasonably could be found that the 
conduct was nevertheless within the standards of reasonable care 
under the circumstances. •• Thompson, 395 P.2d at 64. All of the 
cases cited to by plaintiff were decided prior to tort reform and 
hold simply that evidence of negligence is subject to 
justification or excuse "if the evidence is such that it 
reasonably could be found.•• Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. v. 
Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Utah, 1978); see also Hall v. 
Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981). Prior to institution of the 
comparative system in Utah, violation of a statue or ordinance 
was considered prima facie evidence of negligence, subject to 
justification or excuse, to promote justice by protecting a party 
from being thrown completely out of court when the exercise of 
due care itself prevented him from conforming to statutory law. 
As articulated by this Court in Jorqensen and Hornsbv, 
supra. the same result is accomplished under the present 
comparative system when the jury weighs the actions of all 
parties and allocates a percentage of negligence or fault to 
each. When the trial court in the present case informed the jury 
that failure to operate a vehicle in accordance with the law as 
explained, was negligence on the part of the driver, it was in no 
way restricting the jury from allocating the fault as it saw fit. 
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The jury remained free to consider all the circumstances of the 
case and allocate the appropriate percentage of fault to each of 
the parties. The jury was free to attribute any percent of the 
negligence to plaintiff. The trial court even provided the jury 
with an example which apportioned only 25% of the negligence to 
plaintiff and apportioned 75% to defendants. Tr. at 818. The 
trial court instructed the jury that if such was the jury 
verdict, plaintiff would be entitled to recover 75% of her 
damages. Tr. at 818. The trial court had previously instructed 
the jury that it was the jury's exclusive province to determine 
the facts in the case and weigh the evidence. Tr. at 804. The 
trial court instructed the jury that if it found plaintiff 
negligent in causing her own injuries it was to assign a 
percentage "to that portion of the responsibility for plaintiff's 
injuries falling on the plaintiff, if any . . . . " Tr. at 818 
(emphasis added) . Having been advised to consider the 
instructions as a whole, the jury was clearly not misled contrary 
to the law. The trial court then provided the jury with a 
Special Verdict form to aid the jury in apportioning fault and 
arriving at a verdict. Tr. at 821-823. The jury returned a 
verdict ascribing 25% of the negligence to defendants and 75% of 
the negligence to plaintiff. Tr. at 881. The jury also did not 
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even put a monetary figure into the space for damages, clearly 
indicating it felt plaintiff should and would get nothing as a 
result of their allocation of negligence. R. at 1671; Tr. 881. 
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Utah and this Court 
have emphasized in cases similar to the case now before the Court 
that all of the circumstances of the case must be considered in 
deciding a negligence claim. 
Plaintiff argues that negligence on the part of plaintiff is 
subject to justification or excuse. But that is only true if 
there is some evidence of justification or excuse and the 
plaintiff seeks such an instruction. Justification and excuse 
were certainly considered when the jury weighed all the 
circumstances, apportioned negligence, and rendered its verdict 
below. However, and it is borne out by the verdict, plaintiff 
failed to present evidence of appropriate justification or excuse 
to the court. In her brief, plaintiff states that there was a 
high probability that she was not aware of a safe manner of 
negotiating the intersection, she only did what would have been 
typical for other drivers using the intersection, and her conduct 
was reasonable in view of the confusing pavement markings. Brief 
of App. at 12. However, her brief belies her testimony. 
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In plaintiff's testimony at trial, part of which was read 
from her deposition, she stated that she was quite familiar with 
the intersection in question including the painted lines, the 
safety island or median and the safety lane, and had been for 15 
years: 
Q: And you drove through this area? 
A: Quite a few times, I couldn't say how 
many times a year or when, but we used to go 
up there shopping a lot* 
Q: Can you give me some idea what you mean 
by a lot? 
A: Maybe a couple of times a month and we'd 
miss a month and go a couple of times again, 
Qs 15 to 20 times a year, would that be 
correct? 
As Approximately, yes, like that. 
Qs And this was over a 15 year period? 
As Yeah. 
Qs Would it be correct to say then you were 
quite familiar with the intersection? 
As Yes, I was quite familiar with the whole 
city of Helper, all around. 
Tr. at 599 through 600. She continueds 
Qs Again, you testified that you have been 
on that road frequently. 
As Oh, yeah. 
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Q: Every year for quite a number of times 
for 15 years. 
A: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Tr. at 600. See also page 600 lines 11 through 16. She also 
stated: 
Q: How about 1983, how many times would you 
have driven it in 1983, and driven versus 
being a passenger? 
A: I had driven it quite a bit. Like I say, 
my husband had a stroke, so I did the 
driving. 
Tr. at 593. She was familiar with the safety lane which was 
inappropriately referred to by counsel as a merge lane because it 
did not actually merge but became a lane of its own: 
Q: And east of that lane, I guess, is this 
left hand merge lane that vehicles from your 
position would have turned into and then 
eventually merged into through traffic? 
A: Right. 
Tr. at 596. In the past she had always used the "merge" lane 
with which she was familiar: 
Q: So you turn left, and there is a merge 
lane that takes you over to the southbound? 
A: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q: On the date of the accident, did you use 
that merge lane? 
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A: Well I always did before, but, sir, I 
don't know, I can't remember. . . • 
Tr. at 585:17-20. She continued: 
Q: . . . You had driven this route on prior 
occasions, made the left turn lane going 
southbound? 
A: Right. 
Q: And you had used the merge lane? 
A: Right. 
Q: And you were aware that that merge lane 
existed? 
A: Right. 
Tr. at 586. Later she testified: 
Q: What you are telling me, then, is that 
you do not know whether you used the merge 
lane that you used on prior occasions in 
driving this same route on the day of the 
accident? 
A: I always had before, so why would I 
change it for one time? 
Tr. at 585 through 586. She clearly testified that she was not 
confused on the day in question, and had never been before by the 
lines or markings on the road: 
Q: . . .At this time, okay, do you have any 
memory or do you feel that you were confused 
by any of these lines in this intersection? 
A: Not that I remember. There was - they 
didn't even bother me before. . . . 
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Tr. at 597. Earlier she had stated: 
Q: Is there anything about the intersection 
markings or signs that you were unable to 
understand? 
A: Well you really just had to watch what 
you're doing and stay in your lane and watch 
where you're going. 
Tr. at 587. She was also not confused by some changes made in 
the lines: 
Q: . . . [Y]ou indicated that the lane 
marking had changed, but that you have been 
aware of those changes . . . 
A: Yeah. 
Q: - What the lanes were supposed to convey 
to the motorist? 
A: Yeah. 
Tr. at 598. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S288A (1965) enumerates the 
following defenses to negligence based on a violation of statute: 
1. The violation is reasonable because of 
the actor's incapacity; 
2. The actor neither knows nor should know 
of the occasion for compliance; 
3. The actor is unable after reasonable 
diligence or care to comply; 
4. The actor is confronted by an emergency 
not due to his own misconduct; and 
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5. Compliance would involve a greater risk 
of harm to the actor or to others. 
Clearly, the "justification or excuse" alleged by plaintiff at 
page 12 of her brief is insufficient and is not found in the 
categories suggested by the Restatement (Second) of Torts §288A 
(1965) or in the evidence. There was no evidence of incapacity, 
lack of knowledge, inability, emergency or risk of harm. 
Plaintiff's argument that if the jury believed plaintiff's 
version of the evidence it could easily have found justification 
or excuse for her conduct is not warranted by the evidence. It 
also ignores the trial court's charge to the jury. The jury had 
the option to return a verdict proportioning any amount of fault 
it saw fit to plaintiff. It was so instructed. Tr. at 817-823. 
It chose not to do so. 
It is clear that plaintiff failed at any time to request an 
instruction from the trial court on the principle of 
justification or excuse. See plaintiff's proposed instructions, 
Tr. at 1594 through 1596. It is likely that plaintiff was aware 
that little if any evidence on either principle had been 
presented to the Court. Plaintiff may also have realized that an 
instruction on justification or excuse was surplusage given that 
the jury would weigh all the facts in apportioning negligence to 
the parties. Had plaintiff complied with law no harm would have 
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occurred to anyone. The instructions on negligence were 
appropriate as given. 
Assuming, arguendo, that it is determined the instructions 
were given in error, any such error was harmless to plaintiff. 
The jury was given several examples of appropriate verdicts in 
the case, two of which would have allowed plaintiff to recover. 
Tr. at 818. The jury was instructed that it was within its sole 
province to apportion fault and render a verdict. Tr. at 804, 
817-823. The verdict returned by the jury found plaintiff 75% at 
fault and respondent 25% at fault in the accident. The judgment 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT DEFENDANT LINGLE 
OWED A DUTY TO EXERCISE DUE CARE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Plaintiff argues that instruction 14, which was presented to 
the jury on the law of the right-of-way, is incomplete in failing 
to advise the jury of the duty of the "favored driver" to 
exercise due care. Despite the protest of plaintiff, it is clear 
that the instruction is perfectly appropriate, even if it were 
standing alone. The instruction does not speak of "favored 
drivers" vs. "disfavored drivers," but explains simply that when 
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the driver of one vehicle should reasonably apprehend an 
immediate hazard, she should immediately yield the right-of-way 
to a second vehicle apprehended as the hazard. The instruction 
applies to defendant Lingle as well as plaintiff. 
Plaintiff is correct that one who possesses the right-of-way 
may not exercise it when a reasonable person possessing the 
right-of-way would see and avoid a danger. Plaintiff concedes 
that defendant Lingle possessed the right-of-way under the 
circumstances and labels defendant Lingle the "favored driver." 
Yet plaintiff ignores the fact that the trial court was 
extremely thorough in describing the duties owed by both drivers, 
plaintiff and defendant. In instruction no. 2, the trial court 
informed the jury that it was "to consider all the instructions 
as a whole and to regard to each in the light of all the others." 
Tr. at 805. In instruction no. 8, the trial court informed the 
jury that negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and 
prudent person would have done under the circumstances. Tr. at 
807. In instruction no. 10, the trial court advised the jury 
that ordinary care is that degree of care which a reasonably 
prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances. 
Tr. at 808. The trial court then instructed the jury, in 
instruction no. 13, that: 
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It was the duty of the drivers of the 
vehicles involved in the accident to use 
reasonable care under the circumstances in 
driving their vehicles to avoid danger to 
themselves and others and to observe and be 
aware of the condition of the highway, the 
traffic thereon, and other existing 
conditions. 
Tr. at 809 (emphasis added). The trial court explained that 
respondent Lingle was obliged to keep a proper lookout, keep 
control of his vehicle, and maintain a safe and reasonable speed. 
Tr. at 809. The court then stated that the failure of a driver 
to carry out any one of the above duties would constitute 
negligence. Tr. at 810. 
In light of the above instructions plaintiff's point that 
the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on 
defendant Lingle's duty of due care is groundless. The trial 
court emphasized the fact that both drivers involved in the 
accident were operating under a duty to exercise due care under 
the circumstances. Tr. at 809. When the members of the jury 
retired to deliberate, it was abundantly clear to them that they 
were required to weigh the negligence of both parties, including 
defendant Lingle. The verdict returned by the jury expressly 
finds defendant Lingle negligent and attributes 25% of the fault 
in the accident to him. The instructions describing the laws of 
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right-of-way and negligence were entirely proper, and the verdict 
returned by the jury should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment rendered in the trial court in favor of 
defendants Jimmy Wray Lingle and Roadrunner Trucking, Inc. should 
be affirmed, because no reversible error was committed by the 
trial court. If it be determined that error was in fact 
committed, such error was harmless to plaintiff as explained 
above. Plaintiff's expert on human factors was allowed to 
testify on all ultimate issues for which he believed he was 
qualified, and he presented substantial testimony on the 
reasonable conduct of plaintiff and general users of the 
intersection where the accident occurred. The trial court's 
instructions, that failure to operate a vehicle in accordance 
with the law as explained, was negligence, were proper and 
allowed the jury to assign any percentage of fault to each of the 
parties. Since the advent of the comparative negligence system 
in Utah, this Court has held a violation of statute to be 
negligence per se, subject only to justification and excuse. 
The plaintiff sought no instruction on justification or excuse, 
and no evidence existed supporting such a defense or instruction. 
Finally, the trial court carefully instructed the jury that it 
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was the duty of both drivers involved in the accident to use 
reasonable care under the circumstances. 
For the above reasons, respondents respectfully request that 
the Court affirm the judgment of the trial court and deny 
plaintiff any reversal, remand, recovery, or other relief herein. 
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